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I  am  glad  I  came  to  the  Commercial  Speech  Symposium  and
was  allowed  the occasion  to  reread  Steve  Shiffrin's  work'  and  also
become  acquainted  with  the  rather  remarkable  community  that
Loyola Law School represents.
I  think  it is  really  Ed Baker2  whom  I have  to  address  here.  I
could not agree  with him less.  Like Ed 3 -and  like some,  but not  all
of you-liberty, to  my mind, is the first virtue.  And the reason that
liberty is the first virtue could be connected to and derived from who
we  are;  liberty  is  a  basic  responsibility  to  ourselves  for  what  we
make of our lives, the only lives we will ever have.
That  liberty  entails,  first of all,  the most important  of liberties:
liberty of the mind.  Everything that comes into us, all the sensations,
are judged by the mind.  It is by the mind that we determine  who we
will be  and what  we will value.  That  is why liberty  of the mind  is
the crucial  liberty.  That liberty is most closely connected  to the fact
that  we  are  distinct  individuals  living  the  only  lives  we  will  ever
have.  From that, it is a very  quick and necessary step  to notice that
we  are not just minds;  we  are  embodied  minds, and therefore,  from
the liberty of the mind we come by a very short step to the liberty of
the body and all the expressions of the body that entails.  And that is
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1.  See, e.g.,  STEVEN  H.  SHIFFRIN,  DISSENT,  INJUSTICE,  AND THE  MEANINGS OF AMERICA
(1999);  STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,  THE FIRST AMENDMENT,  DEMOCRACY,  AND ROMANCE  (1990).
2.  C.  Edwin  Baker,  Nicholas  F.  Gallichio  Professor  of  Law  and  Professor  of
Communication,  University of Pennsylvania  Law School.
3.  See C. Edwin Baker, Steve Shiffrin: Friend  and Scholar,  41  LoY. L.A. L. REV.  49 (2007)
(discussing individual  liberty, arguing that commercial  speech should be denied First Amendment
protection, and defending  the merits of restricting media concentration).LOYOLA  OF  LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW  [Vol. 41:329
why  I  thought  finally, finally the  Supreme  Court  spoke  as  a  true
libertarian  organ in the Lawrence 4 case.
But that is just a  step along  the way in the  argument because-
here  is  where  my  profound  but  respectful  disagreement  with  Ed5
comes  in-from  mind  to  body  to  work  is  a  series  of very  short,
inevitable,  and  desperately  important  steps.  Work  is  what  we  do
with our bodies;  it is one of the things we do  with our bodies as we
seek to live  and as we  interact with others.  If somehow  the liberty
which  we  acknowledge  in  respect  to  our  minds  and  bodies
disappears-poofl-when  we  join  the  world  of  work,  something
really quite awful happens, because it is in the world of work that the
most urgent manifestations  of our minds and bodies take place.  Now
I  have  a  more  capacious  view  of work  than  Ed,  and  if you  think
about it, in the end you will come to agree with my view and not his.
I view my term "work"  to include what we are doing here today, the
dinner that I am looking forward to tonight, the exchange  I will have
with the people who cooked that dinner, and the concert which I will
enjoy tonight  in the Walt Disney  Concert Hall.  Not to  mention the
beauties of this quadrangle6 that was produced by work, and that our
being in it is a kind of work.
But I would include-and here  is where the conversation  gets a
little  X-rated,  but  I  see  no children-I  would  say that dancing  and
making love are work.  They are the expenditure of mind and body to
produce things  with others.  Now,  Ed says, "Ah, yes, but there  is  a
radical  discontinuity  between  the  . . ."  well,  I  do  not  know  quite
where,  but  I  am  sure  he  would  draw  the  line  at  making  love.
However,  does what the Los Angeles  Philharmonic  will produce  for
me  this  evening  fall  (to  use  a  phrase  from  Roberto  Unger's
wonderful essay)7 on the Venetian or the Belmontian  side?  Belmont
4.  Lawrence  v.  Texas,  539 U.S.  558  (2003)  (holding  that  a  Texas  statute  that placed  a
criminal  prohibition  on  consensual  homosexual  sodomy  between  consenting  adults
unconstitutionally impinged on individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment),  overruling  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186  (1986).
5.  See, e.g.,  C.  Edwin Baker, Paternalism,  Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary  in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv.  1161,  1163 (2004)  (arguing that commercial
entities  are  not "flesh  and blood  citizens"  and are  instead  "instrumental  creations  that we bring
into legal existence in order to serve our interests").
6.  Referring  to  the  campus of Loyola  Law School  in  downtown Los Angeles,  California,
designed by Pritzker-Prize-winning  architect Frank 0.  Gehry.
7.  Roberto  Mangabeira  Unger,  The Critical  Legal Studies Movement, 96  HARV.  L.  REV.
561,  622-23  (1983)  (referring  to  the  contrast  between  the  people  of Venice  and  Belmont  inFIRST AMENDMENT
being the land of Ed Baker;  Venice being the land of commerce.  But
really, is what happens at the philharmonic  Venetian or Belmontian?
Well,  it  is  obviously  both,  and  my  conclusion  from  that  is  that
Venice is, or can be, Belmontian.  The reference  in Roberto's work is
to  The Merchant of Venice'  and  the  land  of Belmont  is  the  terra
firma,  the  beautiful  suburb where  all  the merchants  repair  when the
day's work is done.
And,  to  confuse  you  more,  how  about  not the  Los  Angeles
Philharmonic,  which  could scarcely  operate  as  a pick-up  operation,
but a  string  quartet?  That  can  be  Venetian  or Belmontian.  I  can
sometimes  actually  pay people  to  play  with me for  some  reason  or
another, or I do not have to.  I  do not see why it makes any difference
whether  they  are  paid  or  not.  Ed  says-in  this  rather  antique,
Marxist view which he is expressing-"Ah,  when money's  involved,
it  is an exchange of power."9  Consider the sexual exchange.  Is that
an  exchange  of power?  Well,  yes,  no,  and  maybe.  Are  we  all
dominated by power in our professional  lives?  Is  it the case that we
are all compelled to  do that which will make us the most money?  If
so,  I would  say no  one  in  this room  would be  doing  what they  are
doing.  Not one person.  I certainly would not be.
We  are free  to earn  the most money we can,  to be beach  bums,
or  anything  in  between,  and  what  we  do  now  is  somewhere  in
between.  Therefore,  I do not  see  the  market  as  this radical  land  of
un-freedom  while  everything  else  from  mind  to  body  to
collaborative,  constructive  enterprise-whether it is the string quartet
or the lovemaking or whatever-is Belmontian.  I think we all live in
both  places,  and  if  we  live  in  a  decent  society,  a  reasonably
prosperous  society,  we  can make  our Venices  as Belmontian  as we
choose;  and  indeed,  all  of us  have  chosen  to  make  them  rather
Belmontian.  If you  compare the way we  spend our days to the way
that  a  master  of the  universe  spends  his  at  Goldman  Sachs,  you
William  Shakespeare's  The  Merchant of Venice,  and  arguing  that  classical  contract  theory
dichotomizes  life  into  a  sphere  of commerce  supervised  by  the  government  (Venetian)  and  a
separate sphere of personal  interactions unmotivated by commerce (Belmontian)).
8. WILLIAM  SHAKESPEARE,  THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.
9.  See,  e.g.,  Baker,  supra  note  3;  KARL  MARX,  ECONOMIC  &  PHILOSOPHICAL
MANUSCRIPTS  (Martin  Milligan  trans.,  Progress  Publishers  1959),  available  at  http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm  (arguing  that  alienation of
human  work  is  the  defining  feature  of  capitalism  and  that  individuals  sell  labor  power  for
monetary compensation).
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would see  that we are  exercising  our  freedom.  We  are free,  but we
are paid, and  we are not  as free as we would like to be.  And that is
because there are other people in the world.
So that is the  general framework in which I view the question of
commercial  speech.  There  are many places, and I have  learned some
of them  at  this  conference,  where  the  freedom  of the  mind  is  not
really  implicated,  and  so  be  it.  That  is  fine.  But  the  tobacco
companies making smoking seem attractive is really in the domain of
freedom  of the mind,  and I  do not  see that  there  is  even a  coherent
account of why, because  it is  a corporation,  all  of a sudden we have
crossed  the  lagoon,  and  we  are  in Venice.  What  is  a  corporation
after all?  It  is like  a  symphony orchestra,  or a  quartet,  or  a  couple
making  love:  a  collection of people  organizing  their joint activities.
It  is  nothing  else,  and  I  would not  reify  the  corporation  as  being
anything else.  What proves my point is that if Philip Morris  were  a
sole  proprietorship,  that would  not change  one  whit our judgments
for or  against tobacco  advertising,  or whether  there  must be  a label
on cigarettes saying these things will kill you.
Well,  I have put  enough ideas before  you.  These  ideas  can  be
put forward  in a more  coherent  and a more disciplined  way.  I have
recently tried to do that,"  but I think I have introduced my ideas and
invited you to think of a possible  alternative to some of the premises
which  have  been  put  forward  as  if they  were  axiomatic  and  self-
demonstrating,  but they are  not.  Indeed, not only  are they not self-
demonstrating, they are false.
10.  See CHARLES  FRIED, MODERN  LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS  OF GOVERNMENT  (2006).